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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Bernal was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
misdemeanor reckless driving, and misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident.  He received
an aggregate unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Bernal
contends that he was denied his right to due process because of a fatal variance between the
charging document and the jury instruction on reckless driving.  Mr. Bernal also contends that he
was denied his right to due process because of a fatal variance between the charging document
and the jury instruction defining assault.  Mr. Bernal further contends that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by misrepresenting its theory of guilt to the jury; a theory not charged in
the Information.  Finally, Mr. Bernal contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
bolstering the testimony of the State’s witnesses.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Bernal was charged by Information with aggravated assault by using a deadly
weapon, misdemeanor reckless driving, and misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident.
(R., pp.47-49.)  The case proceeded to trial.
At trial, Carmen Becerra testified that on May 10, 2016, she was driving behind a light
blue Buick being driven by her ex-boyfriend, John Bernal.  (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.5-17; p.14, Ls.12-
23; p.16, Ls.16-24; p.20, Ls.15-20.)  She testified that, while they were stopped at a road
construction site, he got out of his car and walked toward her.  (Trial Tr., p.17, Ls.2-6; p.19,
Ls.13-19.)  When she saw him approaching, she turned off onto a side street.  (Trial Tr., p.19,
L.25  -  p.20,  L.2.)   Mr.  Bernal  got  back  in  his  car  and  caught  up  to  her  again  on  another  side
street, Granger Street.  (Trial Tr., p.20, Ls.8-16.)  Ms. Becerra testified that she was driving very
2fast, and Mr. Bernal was driving close to her bumper.  (Trial Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.14.)  Ms.
Becerra sped up, then stomped on her brakes.  (Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.16-17.)  When she slammed on
her brakes, Mr. Bernal was forced to slam on his brakes and he swerved around Ms. Becerra’s
car to avoid hitting her.  (Trial Tr., p.21, L.16 – p.22, L.9.)  In doing so, he hit a white parked car.
(Trial Tr., p.22, Ls.10-15.)  Mr. Bernal got out of his car, but apparently did not speak to the
owner of the car, which had a small scrape on the fender and a broken turn signal light.  (Trial
Tr., p.22, Ls.16-20; p.66, Ls.15-22; State’s Ex. 2.)  Ms. Becerra went home, where she lived with
her mother, her brother Gustavo Becerra, and his wife and child.  (Trial Tr., p.23, Ls.8-18.)  As
she headed home, Ms. Becerra called her brother to ask him to open the front door because the
door handle was broken.  (Trial Tr., p.23, L.22 – p.24, L.12.)
At trial, Gustavo Becerra testified that when his sister arrived at the house, he let her in,
then took a baseball bat and waited outside for Mr. Bernal to show up.  (Trial Tr., p.38, L.24 –
p.40, L.7.)  He had seen Mr. Bernal walking a few blocks from the house.  (Trial Tr., p.38, Ls.6-
13.)  As Mr. Bernal approached the house, Mr. Becerra told him to leave.  (Trial Tr., p.40, Ls.8-
25.)  When he did not leave, Mr. Becerra hit him with the baseball bat, hard, in the leg.  (Trial
Tr., p.40, L.8 – p.43, L.8.)  Mr. Becerra said he saw Mr. Bernal holding a pocket knife in his
pocket.  (Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.3-23; p.58, Ls.14-16.)  After the first hit, Mr. Bernal stepped back,
took the knife all of the way out of his pocket, and then, while holding the knife close to his own
body, he stepped aggressively towards Mr. Becerra.  (Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.17-19; p.44, Ls.2-16.)
Mr. Bernal then asked Mr. Becerra if he could give him a ride, walked toward to door, and
Mr. Becerra hit Mr. Bernal again with the bat, this time in the ribs.  (Trial Tr., p.43, L.20 – p.44,
L.23.)  At that point, Mr. Bernal backed up, made some threats to Mr. Becerra, and began
walking away from Mr. Becerra’s house.  (Trial Tr., p.44, L.24 – p.45, L.16.)  Mr. Becerra
3followed him, and when Mr. Bernal reached the street, he pulled the knife back out of his pocket
and swiped the knife toward Mr. Becerra.1  (Trial Tr., p.45, L.16 – p.47, L.5.)  Mr. Becerra
testified that he had moved out of the way in anticipation of Mr. Bernal’s action.  (Trial Tr., p.46,
Ls.6-11.)  After saying he would be back, Mr. Bernal walked away.  (Trial Tr., p.47, Ls.11-20.)
Mr. Becerra was the only witness who testified that Mr. Bernal was holding a knife during this
encounter.  Carmen Becerra testified that, despite what she apparently wrote in her prior police
report, she never did see a knife in Mr. Bernal’s hand.  (Trial Tr., p.28, Ls.11-25; p.30, Ls.3-18.)
Ms. Becerra, who was watching from the living room window, said she did see Mr. Bernal lunge
toward  Mr.  Becerra  before  Mr.  Becerra  hit  Mr.  Bernal  with  the  bat.   (Trial  Tr.,  p.26,  Ls.1-23;
p.30,  Ls.3-18.)    Ms.  Becerra  testified  that  Mr.  Bernal  left  on  foot  after  that.   (Trial  Tr.,  p.26,
Ls.24-25.)
Wang  Le  testified  that  he  saw  a  blue  Buick  hit  his  car.   (Trial  Tr.,  p.62,  L.11  –  p.63,
L.18.)   Mr.  Le  was  not  in  the  car,  but  it  was  parked  in  front  of  his  house  on  Granger  Street.
(Trial Tr., p.62, L.7 – p.63, L.3.)  Mr. Le called 911.  (Trial Tr., p.64, Ls.1-6.)  He did not talk to
the driver of the blue Buick, but identified him as a man with long hair and a mustache.  (Trial
Tr., p.66, Ls.1-22.)
Both sides rested, and the jury was sent to deliberate.  (Trial Tr. p.68, Ls.3-4; p.108,
Ls.21-25.)  During deliberations, the jury asked if they could consider a (simple) assault charge
instead of an aggravated assault charge.   (R., p.99.)  The jurors also asked the court for a
transcript of the testimony about the knife, and the district court had the court reporter re-read the
testimony of Gustavo Becerra. (R., pp.99, 102.)  The district court, upon the agreement of both
1 It is not clear when the knife was in Mr. Bernal’s pocket and when it was out of Mr. Bernal’s
pocket.  Mr. Becerra’s testimony about the knife was varied and inconsistent.  (See Trial
Tr., p.42, L.6 – p.44, L.16; p.46, L.7 – 47, L.8; 54, L.20 – 56, L.25.)
4defense counsel and the prosecutor, told the jury they could not convict Mr. Bernal of the lesser
included offense of simple assault.  (R., p.100; Trial Tr., p.109, Ls.7-24.)
The jury found Mr. Bernal guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, reckless
driving, and leaving the scene of an accident.  (8/3/16 Tr., p.2, L.14 – p.3, L.6; R., pp.103-106.)
At sentencing, the district court imposed ten years, with three years fixed, for the
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction, and, for the two misdemeanors, the district
court sentenced Mr. Bernal to one hundred twenty days in jail, to be served concurrently with
each other and with the aggravated assault conviction.  (10/3/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.19-24; R., pp.108-
111.)
5ISSUES
I. Did the district court’s instruction to the jury on the elements of reckless driving
constitute a fatal variance?
II. Did the district court’s instruction to the jury on the elements of assault constitute a fatal
variance?
III. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct by misrepresenting its theory of guilt?
IV. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by bolstering
the testimony of its witnesses?
6ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court’s Instruction To The Jury On The Elements Of Reckless Driving Created A
Fatal Variance With The Charging Document
A. Introduction
Giving this instruction violated Mr. Bernal’s right to due process—he had no notice prior
to the prosecutor’s closing argument that the State was alleging that he committed reckless
driving on Granger Street. The Information alleged that Mr. Bernal “carelessly and heedlessly”
operated a motor vehicle “upon Five Mile Rd., Boise by driving aggressively” and by
“stopp[ing] his vehicle in front of Carmen Becerra’s vehicle blocking traffic.”  (R., p.48.)  The
general reckless driving jury instruction enabled the prosecutor to change its theory at the end of
trial by telling the jury that it could convict Mr. Bernal of reckless driving both for getting out of
his car while it was stopped during construction on Five Mile Road, and by losing control of his
car and hitting Mr. Le’s car on Granger Street.  The elements jury instruction expanded the
conduct Mr. Bernal could have been convicted of by asking the jury to generally find the
defendant, “drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon a highway, or upon public
or private property open to the public, and the defendant drove the vehicle carelessly or
heedlessly or without due caution and circumspection and in a manner as to endanger or be likely
to endanger any person or property.”  (R., p.93.)  Although the instruction at issue was a pattern
jury instruction and the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions are presumed correct (see State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647 (1998), the State had chosen to specify in the charging document
what conduct it believed constituted reckless driving.  Because the jury instruction lessened the
State’s burden of proof as alleged in the Information and the prosecutor asked the jury to convict
7Mr. Bernal for uncharged conduct covered by the general jury instruction, the instruction created
a fatal variance.
B. Standard Of Review
The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law over which the reviewing
courts exercise free review. State v. Alvarez, 138 Idaho 747, 750 (Ct. App. 2003).  If it is
established that a variance exists, the appellate court must determine whether it rises to the level
of prejudicial error mandating reversal of the conviction. See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329
(Ct. App. 2001).
C. The  District  Court’s  Instruction  To  The  Jury  On  The  Elements  Of  Reckless  Driving
Created A Fatal Variance With The Charging Document
“A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case
before it.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010).  Jury
instructions that fall short of requiring the State to prove every element of the offense violate due
process and, thus, rise to the level of fundamental error. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 182
(2008); State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207, 214 (Ct. App. 2013).  The instructions to the jury must
match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to
have committed the crime charged. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007).  If they do not,
there can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. State v.
Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476 (Ct. App. 2013).  A fatal variance
is a due process violation. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. Chapa,
127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
A variance may occur where there is a difference between the allegations in the charging
instrument and the proof adduced at trial or where there is a disparity between the allegations in
8the charging instrument and the jury instructions. State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165
(Ct. App. 2004).  A variance between a charging document and a jury instruction or the evidence
adduced at trial requires reversal only when it deprives the defendant of his substantial rights by
violating the defendant’s right to fair notice or leaving him or her open to the risk of double
jeopardy. State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18 (1985); Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330.  The notice
element requires courts to determine whether the record suggests the possibility that the
defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his or her defense.
State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 418 (1985).
A reviewing court must first determine whether there is a variance between the
information used to charge the defendant and the instructions presented to the jury. See Brazil,
136 Idaho at 329.  If the reviewing court does find a variance, it must then determine whether it
rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction. Id.
The  Information  alleged  that  Mr.  Bernal  committed  reckless  driving,  a  violation  of
I.C. § 49-1401 by operating a motor vehicle:
[U]pon Five Mile Rd., Boise, carelessly and heedlessly by driving aggressively and
stopped his vehicle in front of Carmen Becerra’s vehicle blocking traffic.
(R., p.48.)
The jury was instructed on the elements of reckless driving as follows:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Reckless Driving, the state must prove each of
the following:
1.   On or about March 11, 2016,
2.   in the state of Idaho
3.   the defendant John Jacob Bernal drove or was in actual physical control of
a vehicle
4. upon a highway, or upon public or private property open to the public, and
95.   the defendant drove the vehicle carelessly or heedlessly or without due
caution and circumspection and in a manner as to endanger or be likely to
endanger any person or property
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty.  If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., p.93.)
In  his  closing  argument,  the  prosecutor  went  through  each  of  the  elements  of  reckless
driving.  When he arrived at the fourth element—that this happened upon a highway open to the
public or private property open to the public—the prosecutor told the jury, “[i]t happened on
Five Mile, it happened on Granger; these are public roads.”  (Tr., p.92, Ls.18-21.)  As for the
fifth  element  which  required  the  State  to  prove  “the  defendant  drove  the  vehicle  carelessly  or
heedlessly, or without due caution and circumspection, and in a manner as to endanger or be
likely to endanger any person or property,” the prosecutor said:
This is satisfied in a number of ways.
First, we have his driving on Five Mile.  He stops his car in the middle of a busy
construction area.  He gets out of his car and he walks towards Carmen’s.  That
right there is careless and heedless, a careless and heedless way to drive your car.
And it’s in a way that can endanger people.   If  someone doesn’t  see a park --  a
person stopped in that area, it causes collisions, it causes problems.
This also happened when Carmen was speeding away from the defendant and the
defendant chased after her.  She said that he was right on her bumper.  And then,
they got onto Granger.  And then.  They were going so fast, and Carmen realized
they were going so fast, that she had to put on the brakes.
So she puts on the brakes, he goes around her, out of control, and strikes another
vehicle.   Doesn’t  get  much  more  careless  or  heedless  than  that,  and  it  certainly
already did endanger people and property.  Mr -- Mr. Le was right there when this
happened; he was endangered.  His car got hit; he was endangered.
The defendant was driving reckless, he was driving aggressively, carelessly,
without caution, due caution, circumspection; all of it.  It establishes the fifth
element of reckless driving.
10
(Tr., p.91, L.22 – p.94, L.2.)
Here, Mr. Bernal’s defense was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s last-minute assertion that
he recklessly drove on Granger Street and the broad language of the reckless driving jury
instruction.  In its opening statement, the defense did not even mention the driving on Granger
Street, and, during trial, asked no questions of Mr. Le regarding what he saw specific to
Mr. Bernal’s allegedly evasive action on Granger Street.  (Trial Tr., p.11, L.1 – p.12, L.14; p.67,
Ls.8-9.)  Had defense counsel known the prosecutor intended to ask the jury to convict
Mr. Bernal for reckless driving for his attempt to avoid hitting Ms. Becerra’s car when she
slammed on her brakes on Granger Street, defense counsel could have conducted further
investigation to determine whether there were any skid marks at the scene.  Counsel could have
questioned Mr. Le about whether he heard one or two loud noises and could have asked Mr. Le
to clarify whether the loud noise(s) was the sound of screeching brakes or the sound of vehicles
colliding.  (See Trial Tr., p.62, L.23 – p.63, L.1.)  Further, the defense did not elicit any specific
information from Ms. Becerra regarding how far away Mr. Bernal was from her car when he was
“tailing” her.  (See Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.3-11.)  Defense counsel could have asked her how fast she
thought she was traveling when she slammed on her brakes.  (See Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.15-17.)  All
of this information would have been relevant and necessary for Mr. Bernal to defend against the
new allegation that he was recklessly driving on Granger Street.
D. The District Court’s Error Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error
Mr. Bernal acknowledges that no objection was made to these statements.  Therefore, the
claim raised is one of fundamental error.  The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the standard of
appellate review of unobjected-to error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).  Pursuant to
Perry, a defendant must demonstrate that:  1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights
11
were violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information
not contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,
meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 226.  Mr. Bernal meets all the prongs of this test.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Bernal’s right to due process.  Mr. Bernal was
charged with misdemeanor reckless driving.  (R., pp.47-48.)  The Information alleged that he
blocked traffic on Five Mile Road “by driving aggressively and stopped his vehicle in front of
Carmen Becerra’s vehicle blocking traffic.”  (R., p.48.)  However, the elements instruction
expanded the conduct by which Mr. Bernal could have been found guilty of reckless driving, by
allowing the jury to convict him if it found “the defendant drove the vehicle carelessly or
heedlessly or without due caution and circumspection and in a manner as to endanger or be likely
to endanger any person or property” on any highway open to the public (R., p.92) (emphasis
added), the instruction thus expanded the conduct by which the jury could have found Mr. Bernal
guilty.
Giving this instruction violated Mr. Bernal’s right to due process—he had no notice that
the State was alleging that he committed reckless driving on Granger Street. Although the
instruction at issue was a pattern jury instruction and the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions are
presumed correct (see State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647 (1998), the State had chosen to
specify in the charging document what conduct it believed constituted reckless driving.  For it to
change its theory at the end of trial by telling the jury that it could convict Mr. Bernal of reckless
driving both for getting out of his car while it was stopped during construction on Five Mile
Road, and by losing control of his car and hitting Mr. Le’s car on Granger Street, the State
deprived Mr. Bernal of notice and eliminated his ability to put on a defense against the charge.
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Second,  the  error  is  clear  and  obvious  from  the  record.   The  law  is  clear  that  the
instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by
which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and that if they do not, there
can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk,
151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476 (Ct. App. 2013).  The jury instruction is
in the record, so there is no need for additional information outside the record.  Further, there is
no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction was a strategic decision, as Mr. Bernal
gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to convict him based
on alternative, uncharged act(s).
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.  While the jury heard testimony that Mr. Bernal got out of his car in the middle of
an intersection, the jury also heard evidence that both cars were completely stopped and waiting
for road construction to clear out.2  (Trial Tr., p.17, Ls.2-6; p.19, Ls.13-19.)  It was likely that the
jury believed Mr. Bernal simply got out of the car during the period of time when all of the cars
in front of him were stopped and waiting for the road construction to be over.  Such would not
constitute reckless driving. Perry requires Mr. Bernal to  demonstrate  there  is  a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
Further, the prosecutor, while tying the elements of reckless driving to the facts adduced
at trial, specifically told the jury that had proved Mr. Bernal committed reckless driving multiple
ways—both when he stopped his car on Five Mile Road and, “This also happened when Carmen
2 The prosecutor misrepresented the facts by telling the jury, “He used his vehicle as a weapon.
He  stops  in  the  middle  of  Five  Mile,  a  two-lane  highway,  street,  where  there’s  no  getting
around.”  (Trial Tr., p.105, Ls.17-19.)  However, Ms. Becerra testified that they were stopped in
a construction area, and Mr. Bernal got out of his car to come talk to her—she did not testify that
Mr. Bernal’s actions were holding up the flow of traffic.
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was speeding away from the defendant and the defendant chased after her.  She said that he was
right on her bumper.  And then, they got onto Granger. . . So she puts on the brakes, he goes
around  her,  out  of  control,  and  strikes  another  vehicle.   Doesn’t  get  much  more  careless  or
heedless than that, and it certainly already did endanger people and property.  Mr -- Mr. Le was
right there when this happened; he was endangered.  His car got hit; he was endangered.”  (Trial
Tr., p.93, Ls.3-23.)  Thus, the jury was told that it could convict Mr. Bernal for either his conduct
on Five Mile or the uncharged conduct on Granger Street.
Because giving this instruction violated Mr. Bernal’s right to due process, and because he
meets  all  three  prongs  of  Idaho’s  fundamental  error  test,  Mr.  Bernal’s  conviction  for  reckless
driving must be vacated.
II.
The District Court’s Instruction To The Jury On The Definition Of Assault Created A Fatal
Variance With The Charging Document
A. Introduction
The district court’s instruction to the jury defining assault created a fatal variance.
Although the instruction was consistent with the pattern jury instructions, because the aggravated
assault was charged under only one of the theories of assault, and the prosecutor used the general
definition of assault given by the district court to tell the jury that it could find Mr. Bernal guilty
under either theory, the jury instruction created a fatal variance.
B. Standard Of Review
The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law over which the reviewing
courts exercise free review. State v. Alvarez, 138 Idaho 747, 750 (Ct. App. 2003).  If it is
established that a variance exists, the appellate court must determine whether it rises to the level
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of prejudicial error mandating reversal of the conviction. See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329
(Ct. App. 2001).
C. The  Court’s  Instruction  To  The  Jury  On  The  Definition  Of  Assault  Created  A  Fatal
Variance With The Charging Document
As analyzed in Section I(C), a variance may occur where there is a difference between
the  allegations  in  the  charging  instrument  and  the  proof  adduced  at  trial  or  where  there  is  a
disparity between the allegations in the charging instrument and the jury instructions. See
Montoya, 140 Idaho at 165.
The Information alleged that Mr. Bernal committed aggravated assault by attempt, a
violation of I.C. § 19-901(a), 905(a) where he:
did unlawfully and with apparent ability, attempt to commit a violent injury upon
the person of Gustavo Becerra, with a deadly weapon, to-wit:  a knife and/or by a
means likely to produce great bodily harm, to-wit:  by attempting to stab Gustavo
Becerra with a knife.
(R., p.48.)  Although the district court gave the jury an instruction that provided the elements of
aggravated assault and incorporated the specific facts alleged in the Information—that
Mr. Bernal committed assault “by attempting to stab him with a knife”—the court then gave the
jury an instruction generally defining assault as:
a)  an unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another; or
b) an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of
another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which
creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.
(Trial Tr., p.77, Ls.5-13; R., p.90.)  Immediately after the jury instructions were read to the jury,
the prosecutor began his closing statements.  (Trial Tr., p.83, Ls.7-9.)
15
During his closing statements, the prosecutor told the jury that it could proceed on either
theory of assault.  (Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.1-24.)  Instead of arguing to the jury that it should find
Mr. Bernal guilty of aggravated assault because it had proven Mr. Bernal tried to stab
Mr. Becerra with a knife, the prosecutor told the jury that the first part of the assault happened
“when that knife comes out” because the threat of “violence is imminent” and Mr. Becerra could
see Mr. Bernal approaching with the knife. (Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.5-12.)  The State went on to tell
the jury that Mr. Bernal committed an assault under both sections of the instruction.  (Trial
Tr., p.89, Ls.12-24.)  The prosecutor argued the alternate theory, despite knowing it had only
charged Mr. Bernal with the attempt provision of the assault statute.  Because the jury instruction
impermissibly enlarged the conduct Mr. Bernal was alleged to have done in violation of the law
as charged by Information (R., pp.47-48), and because the prosecutor used that instruction to
argue to the jury that Mr. Bernal committed both the attempt version of assault and the threat
version of assault, the assault jury instruction constituted a fatal variance.
The district court’s instruction to the jury on two theories, assault-by-attempt and assault-
by-threat, is a variance.  (R., pp.89-90.)  That variance, in conjunction with the prosecutor’s
statements to the jury telling them that it had proved assault both by attempt and by threat,
deprived Mr. Bernal of adequate notice—notice that was Mr. Bernal’s constitutional right, and
thus the variance is fatal.
Mr.  Bernal  was prejudiced by the variance.  Mr. Bernal was misled or embarrassed in
presenting his defense—he lacked notice which hampered his defense.  The State did not present
its threat theory until closing argument.  Additionally, Mr. Bernal’s defense focused on whether
the knife was in his hand or in his pocket, or whether there even was a knife, not on what words
Mr. Bernal said to Mr. Becerra or whether Mr. Becerra believed violence was imminent.  (Trial
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Tr., p.28, Ls.19-25 (cross-examination of Carmen Becerra on whether she saw a knife); p.54,
L.20 – p.57, L.13 (cross-examination of Gustavo Becerra about when and where he saw a
knife)).  Mr. Bernal’s defense was hampered by the variance because his defense would have
been different under each theory of assault.  Ultimately, the conduct necessary to establish each
theory of assault was not the same.
D. The District Court’s Error Rose To The Level Of Fundamental Error
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Bernal acknowledges that no objection was made to these
statements.   Therefore,  the  claim  raised  is  one  of  fundamental  error,  and  the Perry standard
applies.  Mr. Bernal meets all the prongs of this test.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Bernal’s right to due process.  Mr. Bernal was
charged with aggravated assault.  (R., pp.47-48.)  The Information alleged that he “did
unlawfully and with apparent ability, attempt to commit a violent injury upon the person of
Gustavo Becerra, with a deadly weapon, to-wit:  a knife and/or by a means likely to produce
great bodily harm, to-wit:  by attempting to stab Gustavo Becerra with a knife.”  (R., p.48.)
However, the elements instruction expanded the conduct for which Mr. Bernal could be
convicted, the “attempt” type of assault found in I.C. § 18-901(a) or the “threat” type of assault
found in I.C. § 18-901(b).  (R., p.90.)  The instruction thus added an alternative theory and facts
by which the jury could have found Mr. Bernal guilty.
As set forth in Section I(D), a fatal variance is a due process violation. See De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
It was apparent from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Bernal based on
either the attempt theory or the threat theory of assault.  This legal theory is not only different
from that with which Mr. Bernal was originally charged, but was not introduced until  after the
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jury had been instructed that there were two theories under which a person could be guilty of
assault.  Mr. Bernal had no notice that the State would be proceeding on both theories until
closing arguments, a time when Mr. Bernal had no opportunity to re-open the case and re-call
any witnesses the defense needed to refuse this new legal theory. This is a classic case of trial by
ambush; giving this instruction violated Mr. Bernal’s right to due process.
Second,  the  error  is  clear  and  obvious  from  the  record.   The  law  is  clear  that  the
instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by
which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and that if they do not, there
can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk,
151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476 (Ct. App. 2013).  The jury instruction is
in the record, so there is no need for additional information outside the record.  Further, there is
no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction was a strategic decision, as Mr. Bernal
gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to convict him based
on an alternative theory of guilt, on facts never alleged until the end of his trial.
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.  The jurors asked the court whether they could convict Mr. Bernal of simple assault.
(Trial Tr., p.109, Ls.7-24.)  Where there were two different theories of assault, if the jurors did
not believe that Mr. Bernal had a knife (and there was certainly testimony that he did not have a
knife but just made a lunging motion toward Mr. Becerra) (Trial Tr., p.26, Ls.1-23; p.28, L.11 –
p.29, L.3; p.30, Ls.3-18), the jury asked the court if it could convict Mr. Bernal based on the
threat theory of simple assault (R., p.99).  If the jury found that Mr. Bernal had told Mr. Becerra
that he was going to hurt  him, combined with Mr. Becerra’s testimony that he felt  afraid,  such
would certainly have been sufficient to convict  Mr. Bernal of simple assault  by threat.   Due to
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the combination of the jury instruction and the prosecutor’s comments, the jury was left with the
impression that it could convict Mr. Bernal on either theory.
Further, with respect to the “threat” type of assault proscribed by I.C. § 18-901(b), the
Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the offense requires an intent to make a threat, by word or
act, to do violence to another. State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888, 890-91 (Ct. App. 2002).
Therefore,  Mr.  Bernal  must  have  intended  to  threaten  Mr.  Becerra,  and  the  lack  of  this  intent
would be a defense.  Further, defense counsel could have cross-examined Mr. Becerra about
whether  he  believed  Mr.  Bernal  would  harm  him,  or  examined  Ms.  Becerra  on  comments  or
statements her brother made after the incident.  However, Mr. Bernal did not present such a
defense, as he did not know until closing remarks that he was being accused of aggravated
assault by threat.
Perry requires Mr. Bernal to demonstrate there is a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the outcome of the trial. Perry,  150  Idaho  at  226.   Mr.  Bernal  has  shown  there  is  a
reasonable possibility that the erroneous instruction, which gave the jury broader grounds on
which to return a guilty verdict than the information set forth in the charging document,
contributed to that guilty verdict.
As a result, the variance in this case constitutes fundamental error.  Additionally, because
the variance deprived Mr. Bernal of sufficient notice, it is a fatal variance.  As such, this Court
should vacate the judgment of conviction as to the aggravated assault charge and remand this
case for a new trial.
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III.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Misrepresenting Its Theory Of Guilt
A. Introduction
Mr. Bernal asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated when the prosecutor misrepresented the law—its theory of guilt—during closing
arguments.  The prosecutor’s misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error because the
misconduct was related to one or more of Mr. Bernal’s constitutional rights, and was so
egregious that it may have contributed to the jury’s verdicts.
B. Applicable Standards Of Review
  Because Mr. Bernal’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional
principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006).
C. The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Misrepresenting Its Theory Of Guilt
“[I]t  [is]  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  establish  .  .  .  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt.   This  notion—basic  in  our  law  and  rightly  one  of  the  boasts  of  a  free  society—is  a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due
process.’” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  Similarly,
the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Additionally, the Idaho
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Constitution also guarantees that, “[n]o person shall be … deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.”  Idaho Const. art. I, § 13.  Due process requires criminal trials to be
fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).  Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318
(Ct. App. 2005).  In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct
must be of sufficient consequence to result  in the denial  of the defendant’s right to a fair  trial.
The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219
(1982).  The aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
Prosecutors too often forget that  they are a part  of the machinery of the court,  and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903).  The
prosecutor’s duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent
evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id., 71 P. at
611.  The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences.
Id., 71 P. at 611.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.  “Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the
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facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)
(internal punctuation marks omitted).  “Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.” State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20
(Ct. App. 2008).  Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State’s burden to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758, 769 (1993); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).  “It is improper to
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” Moses, 156 Idaho at 871
(quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)).
While a prosecutor “may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”
State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 354 (1973) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the
prosecutor “attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than . . . the evidence admitted
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence,” or when the
prosecutor “[a]ppeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory
tactics.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, ___, 348 P.3d 1, 81-82 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The prosecutor’s comments at issue here all took place during closing argument.  The
Idaho Court of Appeals has held that “[c]losing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues
for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case.” State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18 (Ct. App.
2008).  The purpose of closing argument “is to enlighten the jury and to help jurors remember
and interpret the evidence.” Id.  “Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (citing State v.
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Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)).  “[P]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments
will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that
any consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court
informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded.” Abdullah, 158 Idaho at ___, 348
P.3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The prosecutor chose to charge Mr. Bernal with the aggravated assault of Mr. Becerra by
alleging that Mr. Bernal “did unlawfully and with apparent ability, attempt to commit a violent
injury upon the person of Gustavo Becerra, with a deadly weapon, to-wit:  a knife and/or by a
means likely to produce great bodily harm, to-wit:  by attempting to stab Gustavo Becerra with a
knife.”  (R., p.48.)
Mr. Bernal was charged with the “attempt” type of assault proscribed by I.C. § 18-901(a).
(R., p.48.)  The district court’s elements of aggravated assault instruction was consistent with the
charging document (R., p.89); however, the district court also gave a general definition of
assault, which included both the attempt and threat versions (R., p.90).  Despite the fact that the
State had only charged Mr. Bernal with the attempt version of assault, after hearing the court’s
instruction, the prosecutor told the jury it had proven both the “attempt” type of assault and the
“threat” type of assault, as defined by the district court’s jury instruction defining assault.  (Trial
Tr., p.89, Ls.1-24.)
Where it was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bernal
attempted to commit an aggravated assault on Mr. Becerra, as it had charged, the prosecutor
instead told the jury that it could prove the State’s case either by proving attempt or by proving
threat.  Sections (a) and (b) of I.C. § 18-901 define distinct crimes.  While a defendant may be
charged with violating both sections, they have different elements.
23
The prosecutor explained the meaning of the standard jury instruction on simple assault,
ICJI No. 1201 (R., p.90), and told the jury:
But the assault, ladies and gentlemen, happens when that knife comes out, when
that determined face, that threat is right there because the act to do violence is
imminent.  That threat to do violence is imminent, it’s right then as Gustavo sees
him approaching and can tell that that’s about to happen.  That’s when the first
part of the assault happens. . .
(Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.5-12.)  The State went on to tell the jury:
So,  it’s  an  assault  under  the  definition  No.  1.   It’s  also  an  assault  under  No.  2
because the defendant intentionally and unlawfully either threatened by word or
act,  and  both  are  present;  okay?   There’s  –  there  are  words  that  the  defendant
uses.  Maybe not I’m going to cut you necessarily, but words like get out of the
way, words that are threatening, an action if Gustavo doesn’t comply.  Those are
threatening words.  But there’s also the threatening actions; the lunge, the fact that
the knife is there, with its potential ability to cause such harm.
And, again, that apparent ability is right there.  And he does that act which creates
a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is imminent.
How do we know that this created a well-founded fear in Gustavo that that
violence was imminent?  The bat.  The bat shows it.  His response to the lunging,
his response to the – the knife swipe, the bat, the fact that he’s hitting him with
the  bat  shows  he  thinks  that  violence  is  imminent.   He  has  a  well-founded  fear
that the defendant is going to attack him.  And what happens?  He attacks him.
So, both of the definitions of assault are satisfied.
(Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.1-24.)
Where the State argued that it had proven Mr. Bernal guilty because it had shown both
that  Mr.  Bernal  tried  to  stab  Mr.  Becerra  and  that  Mr.  Bernal  threatened  Mr.  Becerra  with  the
knife and Mr. Becerra felt afraid, the State was ultimately telling the jury that it could proceed on
either theory, despite only having charged Mr. Bernal with the attempt provision of the assault
statute.  This “either or” theory harmonized with the simple assault jury instruction the jury was
given which instructed the jury that an assault is committed when a person unlawfully attempts. .
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. or intentionally and unlawfully threatens . . ..  (See R., p.90) (emphasis added).  In doing so,
the prosecutor affirmatively misrepresented the law and its theory of guilt to the jury.
D. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error
Mr. Bernal concedes that he did not object to the prosecutor’s arguments; however, he
can show that the claim raised is one of fundamental error. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
Mr. Bernal meets all the prongs of the Perry test.
First, the alleged errors are a violation of Mr. Bernal’s right to due process and a fair trial.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in
the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150
Idaho at 227.  The prosecutor’s statement misinformed the jury as to the State’s burden of proof,
which was a violation of Mr. Bernal’s right to due process.  See also State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho
570 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error
where the prosecutor misstated the evidence, misstated the law, and appealed to the passions and
prejudice of the jury).
Mr. Bernal was charged with aggravated assault “by attempting to stab Gustavo Becerra
with a knife.”  (R., pp.47-48.)  Where the prosecutor, in his closing remarks, incorrectly told the
jury that Mr. Bernal could be convicted of aggravated assault under either the attempt theory or
the threat theory, he ameliorated the State’s burden to prove that Mr. Bernal threatened
Mr. Becerra with a knife, as it had charged.  Thus, giving this instruction violated Mr. Bernal’s
right to a fair trial and due process.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. These fair trial and due process
violations are apparent from the face of the record and are clear violations of well-established
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law.  The closing statements of the prosecutor are in the record, so there is no need for additional
information outside the record.
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.  While the jury did receive an instruction properly setting forth the elements of
aggravated assault (R., p.89), it also was instructed on the general definition of simple assault
(R., p.90).  The reviewing court presumes that the jury follows the jury instructions given by the
trial court in reaching its verdict. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718 (2011).  Because of the
error, the jury was left with the impression that it could convict Mr. Bernal even if it found that
he did not attempt to stab Mr. Becerra with a knife.
It was apparent from the prosecutor’s misconduct in misstating the applicable law that the
jury could convict Mr. Bernal on an alternate theory never charged by the State.  This removed
the burden on the State to prove every element of the crime as charged. Because the prosecutor’s
last-minute expansion of the applicable law and its theory of guilt violated Mr. Bernal’s rights to
due process and a fair trial, and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error
test, Mr. Bernal’s aggravated assault conviction must be vacated.
IV.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Bolstering The Testimony Of Its Witnesses
A. Introduction
Mr. Bernal asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated when the prosecutor bolstered the testimony of all of its witnesses.  The prosecutor’s
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error because the misconduct was related to one or
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more of Mr. Bernal’s constitutional rights, and was so egregious that it may have contributed to
the jury’s verdicts.
B. Applicable Standards Of Review
  Because Mr. Bernal’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional
principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006).
C. The  State  Committed  Prosecutorial  Misconduct  By  Bolstering  The  Testimony  Of  Its
Witnesses
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.  “Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the
facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)
(internal punctuation marks omitted).  “Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.” State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20
(Ct. App. 2008).  Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State’s burden to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758, 769 (1993); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).  “It is improper to
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” Moses, 156 Idaho at 871
(quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)).  Closing argument should not
include counsel’s personal opinion about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of
the accused. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979).
27
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the prosecutor’s vouching for the
credibility  of  witnesses  poses  two  dangers:   first,  “such  comments  can  convey  the  impression
that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against
the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to a fair trial,” and second, “the
prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to
trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.” United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “a prosecutor should avoid expressing a personal
belief as to the credibility of a witness unless the comment is based solely on inferences from
evidence presented at trial.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 481-82 (2012).  As the Idaho
Court of Appeals has held, “[a] prosecutor can improperly vouch for a witness by placing the
prestige of the state behind the witness or referring to information not given to the jury that
supports the witness.” State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010).3
During its closing statement, the prosecutor improperly bolstered the testimony of all of
its witnesses, telling the jury that the witnesses were credible and told the truth.  The prosecutor
admitted to the jurors that its witness, Carmen Becerra, changed her story, but argued “her
change in story really shows one thing, she’s honest.”  (Trial Tr., p.104, Ls.8-11.)  The
prosecutor said that the reason she wrote in her statement at the time that Mr. Bernal had a knife,
but testified at trial that she actually didn’t see a knife, “shows that she’s honest.  She just wants
to tell the truth.”  (Trial Tr., p.104, Ls.18-23.)  The prosecutor told the jury that Ms. Becerra was
there to testify at trial because she was under subpoena—she did not want to be there and didn’t
want to testify against Mr. Bernal, but:
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What it’s about is telling the truth, and she felt compelled to do so, and she did.
She told the story about what happened on Five Mile, about what happened on –
at Granger.  She told the story about what happened at the residence.  She’s just
being honest.
(Trial Tr., p.104, L.24 – p.105, L.10.)  The prosecutor told the jury to believe its witness because
she was “being honest” and implied that it was Ms. Becerra’s honesty that compelled her to
testify against Mr. Bernal, not the fact that she had (presumably) been served with a subpoena
ordering her to attend the trial or face being found in contempt of court.
The prosecutor then told the jury that the owner of the white car, Mr. Le, told the truth
when he testified, because he was a disinterested person, “a person who doesn’t know Carmen,
Gustavo, or John, who sees something happen, and came and he tell -- and he told the truth.”
(Trial Tr., p.107, Ls.7-15.)  The prosecutor told the jury that Mr. Le’s testimony gave credibility
to  the  testimony of  Mr.  and  Ms.  Becerra,  and  that  “[a]t  the  end  of  this,  what  we  have  are  two
people, really, Carmen and Gustavo, who come and they take the stand, and they tell the truth.”
(Trial Tr., p.107, Ls.7-22.)  The prosecution’s statements improperly bolstered the testimony of
its witnesses, which attempted to secure the verdict on facts and evidence other than that
presented at trial and which appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury and violated
Mr. Bernal’s right to due process.
D. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error
Mr. Bernal concedes that he did not object to the prosecutor’s arguments; however, he
can show that the claim raised is one of fundamental error. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
Mr. Bernal meets all the prongs of the Perry test.
3 Mr. Bernal hereby incorporates by reference the legal authority he previously referenced in
explaining prosecutorial misconduct as set forth in Section III of this brief.
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First, the alleged errors are a violation of Mr. Bernal’s right to due process and a fair trial.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in
the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150
Idaho at 227.  The prosecutor’s statement misinformed the jury as to the State’s burden of proof,
which was a violation of Mr. Bernal’s right to due process.  See also State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho
570 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error
where the prosecutor misstated the evidence, misstated the law, and appealed to the passions and
prejudice of the jury).  Prosecutorial vouching for the credibility of a witness through bolstering
is not merely an evidentiary issue such as when a witness provides vouching testimony.  Instead,
it is a distinct form of prosecutorial misconduct that implicates a constitutional right.
Mr. Bernal was charged with aggravated assault “by attempting to stab Gustavo Becerra
with a knife.”  (R., pp.47-48.)  Where the prosecutor, in his closing remarks, incorrectly told the
jury that Mr. Bernal could be convicted of aggravated assault under either the attempt theory or
the threat theory, he ameliorated the State’s burden to prove that Mr. Bernal threatened
Mr. Becerra with a knife, as it had charged.  Thus, giving this instruction violated Mr. Bernal’s
right to a fair trial and due process.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The State’s Information and the
closing statements of the prosecutor are in the record, so there is no need for additional
information outside the record.  Further, failure to object to the testimony was not a tactical
decision by Mr. Bernal’s counsel.  Where the case hinged on the credibility of the State’s
witnesses, there is no advantage in allowing the prosecutor to tell the jury that all of its witnesses
were telling the truth.
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Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.  Mr. Becerra, Ms. Becerra, and Mr. Le were the only witnesses against Mr. Bernal.
There was no physical evidence of either the reckless driving (as charged) or the aggravated
assault.  Therefore, in order for the prosecutor to obtain a conviction on both of these counts, it
was necessary for the jury to believe the testimony of the State’s witnesses.
The jury had a difficult time determining whether Mr. Bernal was guilty.  The jury took a
long time to make its credibility determinations, and even needed to re-hear Mr. Becerra’s
testimony about the knife.  (Trial Tr., p.109, L.5 – p.110, L.5; R., pp.78-79, 99, 102.)  The jury
deliberated for several hours and asked several questions of the court before retiring for the night
on the first evening.  (Trial Tr., p.109, L.5 – p.110, L.5; R., pp.78, 99, 102.)  On the second day
of deliberations, the jury deliberated for another few hours, before it finally reached its verdicts.
(8/3/16 Tr., p.1, L.1 – p.4, L.22; R., p.79.)
Because the prosecutor’s misconduct in bolstering the testimony of its witnesses violated
Mr. Bernal’s rights due process and a fair trial, and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s
fundamental error test, Mr. Bernal’s convictions must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Bernal respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand his
case for a new trial.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2017.
___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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